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COVID19 - The need for Public Health in a time of emergency 
Andrew Lee & Jo Morling 
On 11 March 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared COVID19 a pandemic. 
Three months on from when China first alerted the world to the emergence of this threat, 
there were more than half a million confirmed cases and 33,106 deaths reported 
worldwide.1 Large epidemics have sprung up in Western Europe and the United States. 
Worryingly, the infection has also emerged in developing countries where the impact of the 
pandemic will probably be worst. Infectious disease modellers at Imperial College London 
estimate that without mitigation, COVID19 could result in seven billion people infected and 
40 million deaths globally this year.2 Consequently, the need for early and sustained 
suppression measures in these settings will be crucial in order to blunt the severity of the 
pandemic and save lives. 
In Europe, Italy was first to be most severely affected with numbers of cases exceeding 
ŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƚĂůůǇ ?ĂŶĚĂĚĞĂƚŚƚŽůůalready three times higher. In the worst affected areas, the 
outbreak was described as out of control and the response has been criticized for its 
 ?ƐǇƐƚĞŵĂƚŝĐĨĂŝůƵƌĞƚŽĂďƐŽƌďĂŶĚĂĐƚƵƉŽŶĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƌĂƉŝĚůǇĂŶĚĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ ?.3 Key 
ingredients for an effective response appear to be the need for extensive testing, proactive 
contact tracing, an emphasis on home diagnosis and care, and the monitoring and 
protection of health care and other essential staff. It is clear that the speed of response 
needed to keep pace with the epidemic spread is exponentially faster than bureaucratic 
processes in health systems. Crucially, there is a need for learning in order to identify and 
understand which approaches work.  
The Italian epidemic was 2-3 weeks ahead of the rest of Europe and certainly the UK. The UK 
adopted a graded Contain WDelay WMitigate WResearch response to the threat, moving from 
an initial containment phase characterized by rigorous contact tracing and testing, to a 
delay phase in mid-March. This approach was considerably less draconian than the 
lockdown measures introduced by the Chinese government, possibly based on the concerns 
of wider socioeconomic and psychological impact of a full lockdown on society. It also did 
ŶŽƚĂůŝŐŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞt,KĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĂŶĚĂĚǀŝĐĞƚŽ ?ƚĞƐƚ ?ƚĞƐƚ ?ƚĞƐƚ ?ĂůůƐƵƐƉĞĐted cases. What 
ǁĂƐŶŽƚĐůĞĂƌůǇĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞĚǁĂƐƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƉŽůŝĐǇŐŽĂůĂƚƚŚĞƚŝŵĞ, i.e. whether 
mitigation or suppression of the epidemic was the aim. What then emerged was an 
unverified narrative that the aim was to allow the infection to burn through the population 
ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽďƵŝůĚƵƉ ?ŚĞƌĚŝŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞŵĞĂŶƚŚĞĂůƚŚƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐďĞŝŶŐ
overwhelmed and the deaths of many, predominantly elderly or with complex co-
morbidities, in the population. Unsurprisingly, tŚĞh<ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚǁas heavily 
criticized by academics who demanded the release of the evidence used to inform the 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?4 The release of the evidence has been slow and it is clear that the 
ůĂĐŬŽĨƚƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶĐǇŚĂƐĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚƚƌƵƐƚŝŶƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ from academics and 
other allied professionals. Transparency is crucial to retain the cooperation and trust of the 
scientific community, health workforce and the wider public. 
The UK government belatedly introduced lockdown measures and adopted a new strategy 
to Suppress WShield WTreat WPalliate. However, this intervention may have come a little late in 
the course of the outbreak and cases of infection have taken off exponentially.5 
Compounded by supply issues for personal protective equipment for health staff and 
ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚŝŶŐŐƵŝĚĂŶĐĞŽŶŝƚƐƵƐĞ ?ƚŚŝƐŚĂƐĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĞƌŽĚĞĚƚƌƵƐƚŝŶƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ? 
There was also a clear split in the public health community regarding the approach 
reflecting the uncertainties in what is known and not known about the virus and how best 
to tackle the pandemic. This has meant that the public health voice has been muddled and 
muted at a time when it needed to be crystal clear. 
ŶŽƚŚĞƌƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĨůĂǁƚŽƚŚĞh< ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŚĂƐďĞĞŶĂƐƚƌŽŶŐĨŽĐƵƐŽŶŝŶƚĞŶƐŝǀĞĐĂƌĞunit 
(ICU) bed capacity as modelling predictions forecast demand for these beds far outstripping 
available supply.6 This has led to frenzied planning and efforts to boost ICU capacity. 
Unfortunately, this fails to build on learning from Italy: like previous outbreaks of MERS CoV, 
ŚĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞƐĞƚƚŝŶŐƐĂƌĞƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƐŝƚĞƐŽĨŝŶĨĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?ĂƐƚŚĞǇĂƌĞƌĂƉŝĚůǇƉŽƉƵůĂƚĞĚďǇŝŶĨĞĐƚĞĚ
ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚŝŶŐƚƌĂŶƐŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƚŽƵŶŝŶĨĞĐƚĞĚƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ? ?7 The Western health system 
paradigm is biased towards hospital modes of care delivery. However, in this epidemic 
ƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽ ?ǁŚĂƚŝƐďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐĐůĞĂƌŝƐƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐŶŽƚũƵƐƚ ?ĂŶŝŶƚĞŶƐŝǀĞĐĂƌĞƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽŶ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌ
ŝƚŝƐĂƉƵďůŝĐŚĞĂůƚŚĂŶĚŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĐƌŝƐŝƐ ? ?7 In common with other humanitarian crises, 
the consequences are pervasive, wide and varied, and therefore require a response beyond 
a hospital or healthcare response. As a public health emergency, it is concerning that there 
is not a stronger public health lead and response. 
The societal impact needs to be considered. It is predictable that the poor, the marginalized, 
those on insecure employment, those living with disabilities, and other vulnerable groups, 
are at greatest risk not just from infection but the indirect consequences. After a decade of 
austerity in many European countries, where health and social care funding has been 
curtailed, coupled with disinvestments in public health systems, there is less resilience 
health systems to cope with this pandemic. Government fiscal ideology of running 
healthcare like an airline, with for example bed occupancy rates of over 90%, has been 
flawed as it has taken out vital surge capacity much required in emergency situations. The 
economic agenda has been prioritized over public health and we are now seeing the fallout 
from this.  Health and social care funding is an investment and a national insurance policy 
against disasters such as the COVID19 pandemic. 
There have been some emerging positives from this crisis. Scientific advice, public health 
and the evidence-based approach to decision-making is valued once more. There has been 
rapid and considerable information sharing by clinicians and academics enabled by social 
media, and in keeping with many other leading journals Public Health has made its COVID19 
content freely accessible. Innovation in ways of working by frontline teams is emerging. In 
the UK, primary care and community health care integration, as well as vertical integration 
between hospital and out-of-hospital care, is taking place where once it may not have been 
contemplated. Indeed, integration and coordination will be essential in order to augment 
existing health and care capacity to absorb the rise in health need.  
On a final note, this pandemic is a global health threat and this will require collaborative 
action to tackle. Whilst the focus of the response may very much be local at the present 
time, only through concerted public health action worldwide can it be successfully 
suppressed, and hopefully in time eliminated. 
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